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Thehistory ofenvironmental ethics reveals that eco­
philosophers have demonstrated an intense interest in 
metaphysical issues. The purpose of this paper is to 
discuss the problems that have driven the development 
of metaphysical themes and the bearing they have had 
upon ethical issues in the field of environmental 
philosophy. In particular I want to discuss the way that 
anthropocentric ethics and biocentric ethics have 
interacted with metaphysical approaches. I am assuming 
that metaphysical issues have been raised in the effort 
to detennine ethical positions in discussions concerning 
humanity's obligation to the environment. 
According to Devall and Sessions, one of the crucial 
themes facing the construction of an environmental 
philosophy revolves around the metaphysical view of 
humanity's place in nature. They recommend that "an 
appropriate metaphysics for the emerging perennial 
philosophy would provide a structured account of the 
basic unity and interrelatedness of the universe while 
at the same time accounting for the importance and 
uniqueness of individual beings."! The metaphysical 
view articulated would be one that not only recognizes 
the worth of all individuals, it would also recognize 
that individuals are ultimately interrelated parts of 
nature. For Devall and Sessions, such a metaphysics 
would begin to lay the ground for an environmental 
philosophy that is nonantbropocentric. 
The nonantbropocentric view stands in contrast to 
the traditional anthropocentric view which holds that 
values are human-centered and anything that is 
nonhuman can only be regarded as instrumentally 
valuable, Le. valuable as a means to human ends. On 
the other hand, a nonantbropocentric position holds that 
humans are part of nature and that the nonhuman 
community is to be regarded as intrinsically valuable. 
I want to suggest that one of the crucial tasks 
confronting environmental philosophy today involves 
the developmentofa world-view which extends beyond 
considerations of ethical theory alone. Remarking on 
the need for a supporting metaphysics in environmental 
philosophy Blackstone stated: "The question that must 
be asked is how we must understand the world if we 
are to find a place in it for the inherent value of 
nonhuman life forms?"2 And Devall and Sessions 
complain that specialists in philosophy "do ethical 
theory entirely divorced from its metaphysical 
underpinnings..." and add that, "Such specialists are 
of little help in developing the deep ecology world-view 
now needed.,,3 
Warwick Fox avers that in the past environmental 
philosophy had been primarily "concerned with 
developing a theory ofvalue in regard to the non-human 
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world. Such a theory is more fonnally referred to as an 
environmental axiology...."4 Thus environmental 
philosophy has had an axiological orientation rather than 
a metaphysical one; however, recent studies more and 
more indicate a transition from the axiological dialogue 
of values to the metaphysical dialogue concerned with 
developing a picture of the world that enriches and 
informs our cognitive grasp of humanity's inter­
relatedness with nature.5 
What are the reasons for the metaphysical interest 
in this field? To a large degree environmental 
philosophy emerged against the background of 
anthropocentric attitudes towards nature which in tum 
gave rise to the debate between anthropocentric and 
biocentric theories of value. These two views have 
been opposed to one another throughout the history 
of environmental ethics. The biocentric ethic appears 
to defend a position that is unacceptable to traditional 
ethics which conceives of humanity as the center of 
value. The biocentric philosophers have endeavored 
to go beyond traditional positions to support their 
ethical views. The biocentrists have turned to 
metaphysics as a means for providing the required 
support. Therefore the metaphysical interests appear 
to be driven by a demand to revamp traditional 
anthropocentric attitudes towards nature. According 
to one philosopher the anthropocentric conception of 
the world was "typified by technology and science; 
with its underlying philosophy of modern day 
materialism, Cartesian dualism, and mechanistic 
naturalism, the concept of environment ofmodern man 
was very much objectified, mechanized, rigidified, 
dehumanized, and possibly even de-enlivened, and so 
de-environmentalized ."6 
This reaction of the anthropocentric view suggests 
that the transition from the anthropocentric view to the 
nonanthropocentric view reflects a desire to recover 
humanity's interrelatedness with nature. The effort to 
make this recovery takes us to a metaphysical account 
of the most basic features of existence. While 
metaphysics with its partly checkered and partly 
hallowed history may not be capable of demonstrating 
the nature of the world with logical necessity, it is 
capable, I believe, of showing the conceptual 
possibilities inherent in a view that recognizes the 
interrelatedness of all aspects of the world while not 
separating man from the rest of the world. The 
metaphysical tum in ecology endeavors to show why 
one paradigm may be more desirable than another; 
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recent studies have focussed on elaborating concepts 
that are required to erect a non-anthropocentric 
paradigm. 
William Grey characterizes the position of nonan­
thropocentrism and its opposition to anthropocentrism 
in the following way: 
the evils of the modem industrial state are 
produced by a particular set ofanthropocentric 
attitudes and beliefs ... An examination of the 
deep ecology of present Western society 
reveals a constellation of attitudes and values 
which we can call the 'technocratic' paradigm; 
it is essential that this paradigm be replaced 
by an alternative which will enable human 
societies to develop sustainable modes of 
living in co-operative harmony with our 
human and non-human companions within the 
comp,lex and integrated biosphere which we 
share... The recognition of the need for a 
radically different paradigm is the distin­
guishing mark which separates shallow 
'reformist' environmentalism from 'deep 
ecology' . Shallow environmentalism remains 
imprisoned by the dominant anthropocentric 
attitudes which are (or tend to be) mechanistic 
and reductionistic, in comparison to the 
holistic, biocentric, non-reductionist concep­
tions which are advocated by deep ecology? 
Here Grey recognizes that the issue at stake is a 
debate over competing paradigms rather than a debate 
over instrumental versus intrinsic value theory. In this 
respect the teon paradigm means an organized and 
structured set of beliefs that serve to prefigure 
significant judgments about the world. Paradigms are 
essential in that they serve as models for informing the 
way we see the world. 
Andrew McLaughlin, in his paper "Images and 
Ethics of Nature," reinforces the idea that the crucial 
matter for environmental philosophy is the conceptual 
framework that recommends how we see the world. 
What is at issue, he urges, is how we regard the 
humanity/nature relationship. "If, instead of seeing 
nature as separate from humanity, we see humanity and 
nature as one matrix, then it is clear that we are part of 
nature. Our relations to nature are internal, in the sense 
that we are as we are because of the larger contextwithin 
which we exist."s 
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McLaughlin's view implies a monism that is 
revisionistic in that it focuses on how the humanity/ 
nature relation ought to be conceived, although it is not 
reductionistic since the integrity of the parts that 
compose nature are preserved. Besides suggesting a 
revision of anthropocentric attitudes towards nature, it 
is also evident that McLaughlin's "image of nature" is 
tied to the doctrine of internal relations. 
Historically that doctrine has played a prominent 
role in the development of monistic metaphysics in 
general and idealism in particular. The linkage of this 
doctrine with theories of reality has been made by 
metaphysicians such as Hegel, Bradley, Royce, 
McTaggart and Blandshard. These idealists insisted that 
interrelations are so complex that all things are 
connected within an organic unity; a change in anyone 
thing would ultimately change all other things. This 
doctrine plays a 'key role in speculative metaphysics 
for those philosophers who conclude that the universe 
must be conceived as a unity. 
In 1973 Arne Naess pointed out that ecology had 
resurrected the doctrine of internal relations.9Agreeing 
with Naess, J. Baird Callicott remarked that: 
Whatever the motive of the idealists 
(coherency theories of truth, the omniscience 
and omnipresence of spirit or whatever) and 
notwithstanding the inevitable entanglement 
of the doctrine of internal relations with other 
currently fashionable topics by mid-century 
neo-scholastics, academic philosophers (with 
'bare particulars', nominalism, the analytic­
synthetic distinction and so on) internal 
relations are straightforwardly implicated 
in ecology.lO 
The doctrine of internal relations could play an 
essential role in constructing a holistic conception of 
nature; however, the metaphysics that embraces this 
doctrine is more closely aligned today with process 
philosophies rather than with the "block universe" 
models suggested by Absolute Idealism dominant in 
the nineteenth century. With regard to the process view 
Callicott remarks that "an object ontology is inappro­
priate to an ecological description of the natural 
environment. Living natural objects should be regarded 
as ontologically subordinate to 'events' and/or 'flow 
patterns' and/or 'field patterns' ".11 Callicott goes on to 
point out that the organic conception of the world is 
not alien to the feature of process and internal relations. 
According to 
the 'organic' concept of nature implied by the 
New Ecology as in that implied by the New 
Physics, energy seems to be a more funda­
mental and primitive reality than material 
objects and discrete entities-elementary 
particles and organisms respectively. An 
individual organism, like an elementary. 
particle is, as it were, a momentary config­
uration, a local perturbation, in an energy flux 
or 'field'. 12 
The emphasis placed on process, internal relations 
and organicism is part and parcel of the attempt to 
establish a holistic image of nature that embraces 
humanity as an integral componentof nature as a whole. 
Thus McLaughlin asks us to revise the idea of ecology 
when he writes that, "Ecology, understood narrowly as 
the study of the interrelations between nonhuman 
organisms and their environments, may not force a 
fundamental change in our image of nature. However, 
when this image is applied self-referentially, it does 
require a fundamentally new image of nature."13 To 
apply the image self-referentially is to conceive of 
humanity as a part of the interconnected whole, not as 
a disinterested objective observer. 
The emergent interest in metaphysics suggests that 
an anthropocentric ethic can be replaced through a 
revision of humanity's place in nature. If this trend 
toward revision continues, then the aim of environ­
mental philosophy will be less concerned to develop a 
theory of rights and obligations and more concerned to 
articulate a comprehensive world-view; that is, a set of 
concepts-suggestive of man's interrelations with the 
world-that allows us to articulate and interpret our 
experience of the world. 
The metaphysical approach in environmental 
philosophy has been forcefully brought out by Michael 
Zimmerman who argues that "to determine what kinds 
ofbehavior aremorally appropriate, wemust know what 
we ourselves and other beings are. In other words, 
ontology precedes ethics."14 Zimmerman's emphasis 
on ontology over ethics is becoming more and more a 
part of mainstream philosophical discussions in 
environmental philosophy. According to this approach 
one's ethical position is dependent upon and derives 
from one's metaphysical view. As Zimmerman remarks, 
Winter 1993 11 Between the Species 
The Metaphysical Tum in Environmental Philosophy 
"before knowing what we ought to do, we must 
understand who we really are."15 
As far as Zimmerman is concerned ethics has been, 
or ought to be, superseded by metaphysics-a point 
certainly brought out by the deep ecologists in their 
quest to tum to metaphysics as a source for recharging 
environmental philosophy and cultivating an ecological 
consciousness. "Academically speaking," says Naess, 
"what I suggest is the supremacy of environmental 
ontology and realism as a means of invigorating the 
environmental movement in the years to come."16 
Agreeing with Zimmerman, Fox holds that the 
metaphysical tum emphasizes the experience of 
"commonality with all that is that is brought about 
through deep-seated realization of the fact that things 
are."17 Here Fox reminds us of Wittgenstein's claim 
that "It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, 
but that it exists."18 In other words, the ontologically 
based approach is notdirected toward giving an inventory 
of the furniture of the world, rather it is intended to 
refer to the fact of existence itself. As Fox says: 
that things are impresses itself upon some
 
people in such a profound way that all that
 
exists seems to stand out as foreground from
 
a background of nonexistence, voidness, or
 
emptiness-a background from which this
 
foreground arises moment by moment. This
 
sense of specialness or privileged nature of
 
all that exists means that 'the environment'
 
or 'the world at large' is experienced not as a
 
mere backdrop against which our privileged
 
egos and those entities with which they are
 
most concerned play themselves out, but
 
rather just as much an expression of the
 
manifestation of Being (i.e. of existence per
 
se) we ourselves are. 19
 
Fox's ontologically based approach not only 
emphasizes the fact that things are, it also points out 
that everything is experienced as an interconnected 
feature of existence. Although his position draws 
heavily upon Eastern sources, it should be noted that in 
the West metaphysical theories combining the insights 
of modem sciencewith concepts of process and unity 
also offer rich sources for environmental philosophy. 
In his book, The Rights o/Nature, Roderick Nash refers 
to "the 'new' physics as interpreted by process 
philosopherAlfred North Whitehead." and remarks that 
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the "heart of the theory was the idea that identity of the 
individual was indistinguishable from the identity of 
the whole, interrelated process."20 William Grey argued 
that Western philosophy has the conceptual resources 
to construct a metaphysics that recognizes man as part 
ofnature. "The realization that we are part of the natural 
world," says Grey, "is an important preliminary to acting 
wisely within it (as has been repeatedly stressed), but 
there is no need to tum to exotic traditions to find a 
solid foundation for this important step."21 Thus Grey 
would agree that appropriate ethical behavior follows 
as a consequence of a world-view that sees humanity 
as an integral part of nature. Moreover, he maintains 
that contemporary science and philosophy are quite 
capable of informing a model of the world and our 
place in it. 
Recent work in science has made a crucial 
contribution to the shaping of a new paradigm for 
environmental philosophy. "Modem science," writes 
Fox, "is providing an increasingly detailed account of 
the physical and biological evolution of the universe 
that compels us to view reality as a single unfolding 
procesS."22 In our century several philosophers have 
utilized science in the attempt to construct world-views 
that sponsor process, unity, and interrelatedness. Most 
notably, Bergson drew upon and was influenced by 
biology and Whitehead constructed a metaphysical 
world-view on the basis of his interpretation of physics. 
Zimmerman has applied the work of the physical 
chemist Ilya Prigogine to argue that the ideas in 
environmental philosophy such as "internal relation­
ships, evolution, emergent qualities, and spontaneous 
generation of order stand in striking contrast to the 
nineteenth century view of the universe as a gigantic 
clockwork whose character and destiny are prefigured 
according to strict, unchanging causallaw."23 
The metaphysical approach that sponsors a 
biocentric ethic supports an organic/holistic conception 
of reality in which individuals are ultimately identified 
with the world as a whole; the emphasis on identification 
stands "in contrast to the objective axiological approach 
that predominates in ecophilosophy generally."24 
Would such a move away from the axiological 
approach burden us with so much metaphysical baggage 
that our philosophy would be more dubious than ever? 
Metaphysical world-views may not admit of logical 
proof as conceived of in a strict rationalistic system; 
however it does not follow from this that they lack 
cognitive status. Like science, metaphysics proposes 
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paradigms that are systems of coherent propositions. 
Such systems provide definitions and interpretation 
principles as criteria against which evaluations can be 
made. One of the problems with anthropocentrism is 
that it assumes, unanalyzed, a system that supports 
traditional ethical standards. It is essential here to point 
out that what is important for metaphysics is not wbether 
its assumptions are verifIable, but that it bas the potential 
for recommending a way of looking at the world. 
Metapbysics may suggest plausible accounts of the 
structure of reality and provide criteria for evaluating 
alternative world-views. 
Sucb accounts would also utilize recent develop­
ments in science that contribute to the construction of 
models for conceiving of tbe bumanity/nature 
relationsbip. With reference to the new pbysics arising 
out of modem science, Callicott observes tbat a 
"consolidated m'etapbysical consensus, thus, appears 
to be presently emerging from twentieth century 
science wbicb may at last supplant the metapbysical 
consensus distilled from the scientific paradigm of the 
seventeenth century."25 And Zimmerman, in bis paper, 
"Quantum Tbeory, Intrinsic Value, and Panentheism," 
investigates quantum tbeory for tbe purposes of 
arguing that nature is an internally related fIeld of 
events. "Tbe paradigm of internal relations," writes 
Zimmerman, "lets us view ourselves as manifestations 
of a complex universe; we are not apart, but are 
moments in tbe open-ended, novelty producing 
process of cosmic evolution."26 
I am not arguing for the bold claim that science is 
moving toward a bolistic interpretation of reality nor 
do I claim to be qualifIed to make that evaluation; 
however, it should be noted that many of the eeo­
pbilosopbers today will argue that modem science is 
certainly amenable to bolistic interpretations ofnature. 
Metaphysics and modern science may suggest ricb 
conceptual resources for the new picture emerging out 
of environmental pbilosopby. This new picture seeks 
to empbasize nature as a unitary wbole without drawing 
a rigid ontological distinction between self and world; 
both are conceived ofas integrative unfolding processes. 
The metapbysical tum will require an investigation of 
those concepts that are best equipped for construction 
of the new image of nature. We can be reminded of 
Wbitebead wbo thougbt that the task of constructing a 
world-view is to articulate the most general ideas in 
terms of wbicb our experience of the world can be 
meaningfully interpreted. 
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What is tbe value of metaphysical world-views 
which seem far removed from the environmental crisis? 
A theoretical view ofnature-informed by science and 
pbilosopby-will not bring about any immediate 
changes, but it may initiate a break with our ingrained 
attitudes and habits that condition our interactions with 
the environment. Susan Buck-Armstrong alludes to 
Whitebead who "likens the effect of a great idea to that 
of a 'pbantom ocean' wbose waves are 'as dreams 
slowly doing their work of sapping the base of some 
cliff of habit' .''27 A new image of nature may gradually 
encourage us to act consistently with a view that 
sponsors a non-anthropocentric system of beliefs. 
The reason wby the metaphysical issues are 
relevant to the ethical debate is that the metaphysical 
position adopted will prefIgure the ethical position that 
one accepts. The difference in tbe metapbysical 
assumptions we adopt is crucial since they determine 
wbat beings count morally. Tbe system is correct 
wbich best protects and sustains life, value and value 
experiences. I want to argue that the biocentric ethic 
is plausible because it is supported by a view that 
conceives of humanity as an integral part of nature. 
As a result nature is conceived of as baving intrinsic 
value. Biocentrism, as opposed to anthropocentrism, 
supports attitudes toward nature that do not lead to 
destruction of the natural order of man's place in it. 
The adoption of this position is the result of accepting 
the organic/holistic interpretation of reality. 
The metapbysics that I argue for is straightforwardly 
holistic. The fasbion today in environmental pbilosophy 
is to level the cbarge of environmental fascism against 
such a position.28 Essentially this is the cbarge that 
holismwould justify sacrificing individuals for the good 
of the wbole biotic community. The problem with this 
criticism, bowever, is that it fails to recognize the 
integrity of the individuals that the bolistic system 
supports. To have regard for the interests of the whole 
is, in effect, to guarantee that the individuals integrated 
within the wbole must be permitted, for the health of 
the system, to realize their functions. Once this feature 
ofholism is acknowledged the charge of environmental 
fascism loses its bite. 
I bave maintained througbout this paper that some 
recent work in environmental pbilosophy illustrates a 
trend to develop a biocentric ethic that is supported by 
aholistie world-view. I have not attempted to elaborate 
on the metaphysical systems that have been applied to 
environmental philosopby for the purposes ofgrounding 
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an environmental ethic nor have I attempted to add 
another metaphysics to the discussion. I have tried to 
underscore a transition in the way some thinkers are 
beginning to approach problems in environmental 
philosophy. The metaphysical views espoused by these 
thinkers are only in a nascent stage; still required is the 
unification, clarification and refmement of key terms 
such as process, events, organic unity and internal 
relations if a new paradigm for environmental 
philosophy is to be erected. 
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